Ambiguity aversion under maximum-likelihood updating by Heyen, Daniel
  
Daniel Heyen 
Ambiguity aversion under maximum 
likelihood updating 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Heyen, Daniel (2017) Ambiguity aversion under maximum likelihood updating. Theory and 
Decision. ISSN 0040-5833 
 
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-017-9611-2 
 
Reuse of this item is permitted through licensing under the Creative Commons: 
 
© 2017 The Author 
CC BY 4.0 
 
This version available at:  http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/80342/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: June 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. You may freely distribute the URL 
(http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
 
 
Ambiguity Aversion under Maximum Likelihood Updating
Daniel Heyen
Grantham Research Institute
London School of Economics
May 25, 2017
Abstract
Maximum likelihood updating (MLU) is a well-known approach for extending static
ambiguity sensitive preferences to dynamic set-ups. This paper develops an exam-
ple in which MLU induces an ambiguity averse maxmin expected utility (MEU)
decision-maker to (i) prefer a bet on an ambiguous over a risky urn and (ii) be more
willing to bet on the ambiguous urn compared to an (ambiguity neutral) subjective
expected utility (SEU) decision-maker. This is challenging since prior to observing
(symmetric) draws from the urns, the MEU decision-maker (in line with the usual
notion of ambiguity aversion) actually preferred the risky over the ambiguous bet
and was less willing to bet on the ambiguous urn than the SEU decision-maker.
The identified switch in betting preferences is not due to a violation of dynamic
consistency or consequentialism. Rather, it results from MLU’s selection of extreme
priors, causing a violation of the stability of set-inclusion over the course of the
updating process.
Keywords: learning under ambiguity; maxmin expected utility; ambiguity aver-
sion; maximum likelihood updating; dynamic decision making; belief dynamics
JEL: D81; D83
1 Introduction
The best-known and dominant approach for decision-making under uncertainty is sub-
jective expected utility (seu, Savage 1954), relying on (the formation of) a unique prob-
ability distribution. Based on descriptive (Ellsberg 1961; Camerer and Weber 1992) and
normative considerations (Gilboa et al. 2008; Gilboa 2009), there have been attempts
to find alternative decision rules reflecting sensitivity to ambiguity, i.e. decision set-ups
in which probabilities are not known. Typical approaches are based on non-additive
probabilities, also known as ”capacities” (Schmeidler 1989; Eichberger and Kelsey 1999;
Chateauneuf et al. 2007), and multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989; Ghirardato
et al. 2004; Klibanoff et al. 2005; Maccheroni et al. 2006).
Dynamic extensions of these static ambiguity sensitive preferences are needed since
“almost all potential applications of interest in economics involve some dynamic ele-
ment. Furthermore, static expected-utility theory comes equipped with a natural, essen-
tially ”built-in” theory of updating and dynamic choice; it is quite natural to ask whether
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existing theories of ambiguity also allow a similarly convenient and effective analysis of
dynamic behaviour” (Siniscalchi 2009). The natural updating theory of seu preferences
Siniscalchi (2009) refers to is Savage’s axiom P2, best-known as the “sure thing prin-
ciple”. This axiom is the basis of Bayesian updating and the obvious way to define
conditional preferences given an event E. Models with ambiguity sensitive preferences
however drop P2, thus precluding this canonical extension to dynamic environments.
Two competing approaches for updating ambiguity sensitive preferences have been
suggested (cf. Machina and Siniscalchi 2014). The first is full Bayesian updating with
a simple interpretation for multiple prior models: all priors in the relevant set are up-
dated prior-by-prior according to Bayes rule. Full Bayesian updating, going back to
contributions by Fagin and Halpern (1991) and Jaffray (1992), was axiomatised for gen-
eral capacities by Eichberger et al. (2007) and for maxmin preferences by Pires (2002)
and Epstein and Schneider (2003). The second updating approach corresponds to the
Dempster-Shafer rule for capacities (Dempster 1967; Shafer 1976) and takes for multiple
prior models the form of maximum likelihood updating (MLU) (Gilboa and Schmeidler
1993): Bayesian updating is applied only to those priors with maximal likelihood given
the observed event.
This paper contributes to the debate about these update rules. Its main contribu-
tion is to design and analyse a simple example to demonstrate that MLU suffers from
unintuitive characteristics. The example revolves around two urns with unknown com-
position. The composition in the first urn is determined via a fair mechanism like a coin
toss (“risk”), while the decision-maker has no information about the mechanism that
determined the second urn’s composition (“ambiguity”). In this standard set-up, an
ambiguity averse decision-maker lacking experience with both urns typically (i) prefers
bets on the risky over the ambiguous urn and (ii) is less willing to bet on the ambigu-
ous urn than a subjective expected utility decision-maker. The problematic feature this
example reveals is that, upon observing a draw from either urn, MLU can reverse both
(i) and (ii) despite the fact that the information provided by the draws was symmetric
across urns and agents.
It is well known that intertemporal ambiguity sensitive preferences tend to be in
tension with standard rationality requirements. For ambiguity sensitive preferences it is
not possible to maintain consequentialism (preferences conditional on event E do not de-
pend on the unrealized part of the decision-tree EC), dynamic consistency (no reversals
in preferences once event E actually happened), and full generality in the representa-
tion of ambiguity attitudes at the same time (Ghirardato 2002; Al-Najjar and Weinstein
2009; Siniscalchi 2009, 2011; Dominiak et al. 2012). Accordingly, some dynamic axiom-
atizations of ambiguity sensitive preferences give up consequentialism (Machina 1989;
Hanany and Klibanoff 2007; Eichberger and Kelsey 1996), others dynamic consistency
(Pires 2002; Eichberger et al. 2007; Siniscalchi 2011), or determine the conditions under
which non-SEU preferences fulfil both dynamic consistency and consequentialism (Sarin
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and Wakker 1998; Epstein and Schneider 2003; Eichberger et al. 2005).
It is crucial that the switch in betting preferences identified in this paper is rooted
neither in dynamic inconsistency nor a violation of consequentialism. In order to clarify
this, the paper adopts the framework of Epstein and Schneider (2007) which respects
dynamic consistency as well as consequentialism.1 The other reason to follow Epstein
and Schneider (2007) is their explicit use of MLU. Concrete, they adopt the generalized
and less extreme MLU, already suggested by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993), in which
also priors that only “epsilon maximise the likelihood function” are updated. This paper
demonstrates that MLU, both in the strict and the generalized form, gives rise to the
switch in betting preferences surrounding risky and ambiguous urns. The deeper reason
is that MLU does not respect set inclusion stability over the course of the updating
process.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the simple example in which
ex-ante and ex-post betting preferences are surprisingly unaligned. Section 3 presents
the underlying framework of learning under ambiguity, a simplified version of Epstein
and Schneider (2007). Thus equipped, section 4 will revisit the example in order to
understand the deeper reason for the switch in betting preferences. Section 5 concludes.
2 Guiding example
2.1 Betting on urns with unknown composition
The example presented in this section revolves around the two urns depicted in Figure
1. Both urns contain exactly three balls. Apart from a white and a black ball, each urn
contains a third ball that is either black or white. The composition of either urn, which
does not change over the course of the experiment, is unknown to the decision-maker.
The key difference between both urns is that the decision-maker knows that the colour of
the third ball in the ’risky’ urn R has been determined via an equiprobable mechanism,
e.g. a fair coin. For the ambiguous urn A, however, there is no information about the
mechanism that determined the colour of the third ball.
In every period and for each urn, one ball is drawn and then put back (sampling
with replacement). The repeated observations enable the decision-maker to learn about
the composition of the urns. The objects of choice are simple binary bets of the form
xUrnColoury on the colour of the next ball drawn. The bet 1
A
B0, for instance, is based on the
colour of the ball drawn from urn A and involves a payment of 1 $ if the ball is black,
and 0 $ otherwise.2
1The price for ensuring dynamic consistency and consequentialism at the same time is a restriction in
acts and ambiguity sensitive preferences that can be modeled within the framework. The simple example
used in this paper is not affected by this restriction.
2Due to xBy = yWx we here and in the following restrict to bets on black.
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Urn R: Risk Urn A: Ambiguity
Figure 1: Two urns with unknown composition. While the colour of the third ball in urn R is
determined via a fair coin, the decision-maker faces ambiguity regarding urn A.
2.2 Two decision rules
The decision-criterion for evaluating bets on urn R is quite straightforward. The stan-
dard Bayesian approach is to start with a prior belief that assigns equal probability to
both composition scenarios and then repeatedly update this prior belief upon observ-
ing more and more draws. Bets are ranked according to expected payoffs based on the
current belief.3 For urn A, the uniform prior distribution lacks the clear ’objective’ jus-
tification. We compare decision-makers following two prominent approaches in light of
ambiguity. The first decision-maker maximises subjective expected utility (seu, Savage
1954), which involves the formation of a unique (subjective) initial prior (in the absence
of further information typically the uniform distribution) about the composition of urn
A that is used to rank bets according to the associated expected payoffs. The natural
dynamic extension of seu is standard Bayesian updating. The second decision-maker
maximises maxmin expected utility (meu, Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989). In contrast to
seu, meu preferences involve a set of beliefs, and bets are ranked according to minimal
expected payoffs. The dynamic extension of meu preferences employed here is MLU as
axiomatised by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) and used in Epstein and Schneider (2007).
The updating process will be explained in detail in section 3.
We compare betting preferences along two dimensions. First, for each decision-maker
separately, we will compare whether the decision-maker prefers a bet on the risky or the
ambiguous urn. Second, for each urn separately, we will compare the willingness to bet
(expressed as certainty equivalents) of both decision-makers.
2.3 Surprising choices
Assume that the decision-makers are currently characterized by the following belief struc-
ture. For urn R, both decision-makers assign the probability 2/3 to the scenario that
the unknown ball is black. Let this also to be the seu decision-maker’s assessment of
urn A, for instance because she held the same initial prior and observed the same his-
3For simplicity we assume throughout the paper risk-neutral decision-makers with u(x) = x.
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tory of draws. In contrast, the meu decision-maker’s belief structure regarding urn A is
assumed to be quite different; her set of beliefs has a tendency towards the two-black-
one-white scenario in the sense that this scenario’s probability ranges from 3/4 to 1. In
particular, this set of beliefs does not contain the ’weaker’ 2/3, currently held by the
seu decision-maker.
It is a simple task to determine the preferences over the standard bets on a black
ball, 1RB0 and 1
A
B0, that result from this belief configuration. Since her beliefs coincide,
the seu decision-maker is indifferent between betting on the risky and the ambiguous
urn. In contrast, the meu decision-maker strictly prefers a bet on the ambiguous urn
A over the same bet on urn R. For urn R, as their beliefs coincide, the seu and meu
decision-makers have the same willingness to bet on the next ball being black, expressed
as a same certainty equivalent. For urn A, however, the meu decision-maker is more
willing to bet than her seu counterpart.
This is unusual. Ambiguity aversion in general and meu in particular is typically
associated with a preference for risky rather than ambiguous situations. But to be clear,
neither the meu decision-maker’s preference for the ambiguous over the risky urn nor the
higher certainty equivalent (as compared to the seu decision-maker’s) stand in internal
conflict with the axioms of ambiguity aversion. Actually, the meu decision-maker is
ambiguity averse given her beliefs: she evaluates the bet 1AB0 based on her worst belief,
here 3/4. The reason for the untypical betting preferences is that this worst belief is still
more ’optimistic’ than her belief about urn R and the seu decision-maker’s assessment
of urn A. In summary, we should not regard the meu decision-maker’s inclination to bets
on the ambiguous urn as problematic per se; it may simply be that she received more
conclusive evidence for the scenario that the unknown ball in urn A is black.
What, however, actually makes this example surprising and noteworthy is that this
is not the case. Rather, the information both decision-makers received about both urns
was fully symmetric. Initially, the level of information was symmetric in the sense that
both decision-makers had not observed any draw from either urn. And indeed, at this
ex-ante stage – and in accordance with usual notions of ambiguity averse behaviour –
the meu decision-maker strictly preferred a bet on urn R over urn A and was less willing
to bet on urn A than the seu decision-maker. Then, again preserving symmetry across
agents and urns, both decision-makers observed the draw of one black ball from either
urn. This information led to the ex-post configuration of beliefs and associated unusual
betting preferences described above. Table 1 summarises the example.
To understand why this symmetric information had the potential to induce such un-
intuitive switch in betting preferences it is needed to have a closer look at the framework
behind the example and in particular the maximum likelihood updating process. This
is the focus of the subsequent section 3. Thus equipped, we can revisit the example in
section 4.
5
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Comparing urns Comparing decision-makers
Stage seu meu Urn R Urn A
Ex-ante 1RB0 ∼ 1AB0 1RB0  1AB0 CEseu = CEmeu CEseu > CEmeu
Ex-post 1RB0 ∼ 1AB0 1RB0 ≺ 1AB0 CEseu = CEmeu CEseu < CEmeu
Table 1: Summary of the switch in betting preferences between before and after observing the
draw of black balls from either urn. The comparison of certainty equivalents is based on the
standard bets on a black ball, 1RB0 and 1
A
B0.
3 Dynamic MEU preferences with maximum likelihood
updating
The framework to verify the switch in betting preferences identified in the previous
section is a simplified version of Epstein and Schneider (2007). In particular, the two
urns presented above are reduced versions of the scenarios in Epstein and Schneider
(2007).
3.1 Fundamentals
The ratio of black balls in the urn is the unknown parameter θ with possible values
in the parameter space Θ = {1/3, 2/3}. The period state space is St = S = {B,W},
identical for all times. We denote by st ∈ S the colour observed by the agent at time t.
An agent’s information at time t is the history st = (s1, . . . , st). The natural full state
space is S∞.
The evaluation criterion for choices about bets on urn R is straightforward. Starting
with the uniform prior µ0 = (1/2, 1/2) over the parameter space Θ = {1/3, 2/3}, the
decision-maker uses Bayesian updating to process the information provided by the ob-
served signal history st to a posterior µt. This posterior, in turn, is directly associated
with a ’one-step ahead belief’ pt(·) =
∫
Θ l(·|θ)dµt(θ) on S about the colour of the next
ball. Here, l(·|θ) is the likelihood of a draw s ∈ S given a composition of the urn θ,
i.e. l(s = B|θ) = θ and l(s = W |θ) = 1 − θ. To rank different bets, the decision-maker
compares expected payoffs. For instance, the expected payoff pi of bet xRBy given the
one-step ahead belief pt(·) is
Eptpi(xBy) = x pt(s = B) + y pt(s = W ) . (1)
There are different decision criteria for bets on urn A. The seu decision-maker
forms a unique prior about the composition of the urn and then follows the stan-
dard Bayesian updating procedure so that the decision rule coincides with that in (1).
In the absence of any observations, the uniform distribution is a plausible prior and
the betting behaviour regarding urn R and urn A indistinguishable. In contrast to
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seu, the intertemporal meu decision-maker initially holds a set of priors M0 that is,
upon arrival of new information, updated to a set of posteriors Mt. This updating
process is characterised by MLU; the next subsection explains this process in detail.
The set of posteriors Mt is, in turn, associated with a set of ’one-step ahead beliefs’
Pt(st) =
{
pt(·) =
∫
Θ l(·|θ)dµt(θ) : µt ∈Mt(st)
}
on S about the colour of the next ball.
The meu decision-maker ranks bets according to maxmin expected utility. Given Pt(st),
the maxmin expected payoff of bet xABy is
min
p∈Pt(st)
Eptpi(xBy) . (2)
Note that the model presented here is much simpler than the framework of Epstein
and Schneider (2007). Here, the decision task is structurally the same at all points in
time. In particular, past choices in no way restrict the remaining decision-tree. Also,
current choices do not impact the ’informativeness’ of the next ball drawn; there is
no room for experimentation and similar considerations of giving up short-term payoffs
for long-term information benefits (see for instance Moscarini and Smith 2001). Every
decision just focuses on the colour of the next ball and has to be made solely based on
what the decision-maker has learned about the composition of the urn. In particular,
discounting does not play a role and can be ignored.
3.2 Maximum likelihood updating
This subsection describes the process of updating the set of priors M0 to the set of
posteriors Mt by MLU. It proves useful to define the plausibility of a prior µ0 ∈ M0
given the data st = (s1, . . . , st) by
Plaus(µ0; s
t) =
∫
Θ
t∏
j=1
l(sj |θ)dµ0(θ) . (3)
We use the generalization of MLU presented in Epstein and Schneider (2007) and already
suggested in the classical paper Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993). Generalized MLU with
parameter α ∈ (0, 1] only updates priors with α-maximal plausibility given the signal
history st. Concrete, the set of posteriors Mt(st) is the priorwise update of the set of
admissible priors
Mα0 (s
t) =
{
µ0 ∈M0 | Plaus(µ0; st) ≥ α max
µ˜0∈M0
Plaus(µ˜0; s
t)
}
. (4)
The strict MLU is the case α = 1 in which only priors with maximal plausibility are
updated. In contrast, full Bayesian Updating is the corner case α = 0 – explicitly not
included in the present paper and in Epstein and Schneider (2007) – in which all priors
are updated unconditionally. The example presented in section 2 and revisited in section
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4 is characterized by α = 4/5.
4 The example revisited
This section demonstrates that the surprising and unintuitive betting behaviour identi-
fied in section 2 is a direct consequence of MLU.
4.1 Ex-ante choices
The example presented in section 2 is based on the following plausible assumptions
about the ex-ante belief structure. For urn R, it is natural that initially both decision-
makers assign equal weights to the two scenarios θ = 1/3 and θ = 2/3. Formally,
they hold the initial prior µ0 = (1/2, 1/2) over the parameter space Θ = {1/3, 2/3}.
In line with the principle of insufficient reason, this is also the prior the seu decision-
maker holds regarding urn A before receiving any information about its composition. In
contrast, the meu decision-maker is assumed to initially hold the full prior set M0 =
{(ν, 1− ν) | 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1}.
This belief configuration directly leads to the following ex-ante betting preferences.
The seu decision-maker is, irrespective of the bet, indifferent between betting on urn R
and urn A as p0(s = B) = 1/2 · 1/3 + 1/2 · 2/3 = 1/2 in any case. As a consequence, the
certainty equivalent of the standard bet on black is CEseu(1RB0) = CE
seu(1AB0) = 1/2.
In contrast, the meu decision-maker bases here decisions on the worst prior in M0.
For a bet on black this is the prior (1, 0) that puts maximal weight on the scenario
with only one black ball in the urn, θ = 1/3. Accordingly, the relevant p0 ∈ ∆(S) for
evaluating expected payoffs is 1 · 1/3 + 0 · 2/3 = 1/3 so that CEmeu(1AB0) = 1/3, while
CEmeu(1RB0) = 1/2. In the decision set-up before observing the first draw from the
urns, the meu decision-maker strictly prefers to bet on the risky urn R, in particular
1AB0 ≺meu 1RB0, and her certainty equivalent for bets on urn A is smaller than seu’s,
CEmeu(1AB0) < CE
seu(1AB0) (cf. Table 1). This is in line with the usual notion of
ambiguity aversion.
4.2 Ex-post choices
We now turn to the situation in which the decision-makers have observed the draw of a
black ball from both urns. For urn R, on which both decision-makers agree, standard
Bayesian updating
µ1(·) = µ0(·)l(s = B|·)
µ0(θ = 1/3)l(s = B|θ = 1/3) + µ0(θ = 2/3)l(s = B|θ = 2/3) (5)
transforms the prior µ0 = (1/2, 1/2) to µ1 = (1/3, 2/3), reflecting the increased subjec-
tive probability for the scenario that the unknown ball is black. This is also how the seu
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decision-maker interprets the black draw from urn A. As a result, the seu decision-maker
is still indifferent between betting on urn R and urn A; also, the certainty equivalent of
a bet on urn R is assessed equally by both decision-makers (cf. Table 1).
The meu decision-maker naturally has a different take on Urn A. To recapitulate
the procedure explained in section 3.2, the first task is to find the most plausible theory
µ0 ∈ M0. This is (0, 1). The plausibility of this theory, cf. (3), is 2/3. With α = 4/5,
the meu decision maker rejects all theories with a plausibility less than 4/5 · 2/3 and
thus keeps the set M0(s) = {(ν, 1− ν) | 0 ≤ ν ≤ 2/5}. Finally, this set is updated to
Mα1 (s) = {(ν, 1− ν) | 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1/4}. Note that this is the set that induced the surprising
choices identified in section 2. As demonstrated there, 1AB0 meu 1RB0 and CEmeu(1AB0) >
CEseu(1AB0). This is a switch to the ex-ante configuration and noteworthy insofar as the
information that caused this switch was symmetric across urns and decision-makers.
Another way to illustrate the surprising behaviour is to compare two different meu
decision-makers. Besides the meu decision-maker starting with the full prior set M0 =
{(ν, 1− ν) | 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1}, consider a second decision-maker meu′ with a smaller prior set,
M′0 = {(ν, 1− ν) | 1/4 ≤ ν ≤ 3/4}.4 Not surprisingly, ex-ante meu′ is less pessimistic
in the sense that the certainty equivalent CEmeu
′
(1AB0) = 5/12 > 1/3 = CE
meu(1AB0) is
larger. Having observed the black ball being drawn from urn A and equipped with the
same rejection parameter α = 4/5, she keeps the setM0(s) = {(ν, 1− ν) | 1/4 ≤ ν ≤ 3/5}
and hence transforms her beliefs to the set of posteriorsMα1 ′(s) = {(ν, 1− ν) | 1/7 ≤ ν ≤ 3/7}.
This results in a certainty equivalent CEmeu
′
(1AB0) = 4/7, now smaller than CE
meu(1AB0) =
3/4. The initially less pessimistic meu′ decision-maker has turned more pessimistic than
her meu counterpart upon observing the same signal.
4.3 The cause of the switch
This raises the question about the origin of the switch just presented, both in the com-
parison of seu and meu as well as meu′ and meu.5 One explanation might be that the
unintuitive betting preferences after updating occur because the intertemporal formal-
ization of meu fails to ensure ambiguity aversion. But this is not the case. Given her
beliefs, the meu decision-maker is in fact ambiguity averse. Through the min-operator
in (2), she is ambiguity averse by construction.
Another possible narrative for the switch is dynamic inconsistency. One may tend
to think – even more so as dynamic inconsistency is a typical deviation from standard
rationality assumptions with ambiguity averse preferences – that the decision-maker
initially prefers bets on the risky urn but cannot sustain, for whatever reason, this
preference over time. Yet, this narrative does not apply here. The decision-makers
actually do not make any plans for future choices and only have preferences over the
4The symmetry around 1/2 can be regarded as the multiple prior analogue of the principle of insuf-
ficient reason.
5seu is the special case of meu′ with M′0 = {(1/2, 1/2)}.
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very next bet. And even if their current choices depended on future plans, dynamic
consistency would be ensured because it is written into the recursively defined framework
of Epstein and Schneider (2007).
The actual reason for the switch in betting preferences is the belief dynamics under
MLU, in particular MLU’s focus on ’extreme’ priors. This gets most obvious in the
comparison of the two maxmin decision-maker meu and meu′ in the last subsection:
What the ’more pessimistic’ decision-maker meu with the full prior set identifies as the
most likely prior after observing one black ball is certainty that the urn consists of one
white and two black balls. For making the point stark we can focus on strict MLU,
α = 1, and see that this ’certainty’ is in fact the only posterior the meu decision-maker
bases her decision on. In contrast, the ’less pessimistic’ decision-maker meu′ with a
smaller prior set cannot regard certainty regarding the composition of the urn as the
most likely prior, simply because this extreme case was not a prior to begin with. In
summary, the property MLU violates is set-inclusion stability of the set of beliefs over
the learning process,
M0 ⊂M′0 ⇒ Mt ⊂M′t ∀t . (6)
Whenever the implication in (6) is violated there is room for a switch in betting behaviour
of some sort to occur. Full Bayesian updating, i.e. the corner case α = 0 in the above
setting, however trivially respects (6).
4.4 The general case
One may argue that the switch in betting preferences can be avoided by adequately
choosing the rejection parameter α. In fact, any α < 3/4 would, at least at t = 1, prevent
the example’s switch in preferences. It thus seems in principle possible to restrict α to
innocent values.
The appendix, however, demonstrates that this is not the case. For every α > 0,
there is a setting similar to that considered in the example for which such a disconnect
in the behaviour of the meu decision-maker occurs. The proof involves a generalization
of urn R and urn A with more than three balls and constructs a signal history that gives
rise to the rejection of the uniform distribution, seu’s initial prior, and thus a violation
of (6). See the appendix for details. Overall this demonstrates that MLU will always be
prone to some switch in betting preferences.
5 Concluding discussion
Ambiguity sensitive preferences play – in theory and applications as well as for descriptive
and prescriptive reasons – an increasing role in economics. Unlike subjective expected
utility (seu), there is no canonical way to extend static ambiguity sensitive preferences
to dynamic settings. The two main competing approaches for this extension are full
10
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Bayesian updating and maximum likelihood updating (MLU). This paper has made a
contribution to the debate about these updating rules by demonstrating that the latter
involves unintuitive ramifications. MLU induces an ambiguity averse maxmin expected
utility (meu) decision-maker to prefer bets on urns with unknown over urns with known
composition and to have a higher inclination to bet on the ambiguous urn than her
seu counterpart, despite the absence of any asymmetries in information across urns and
agents that might have caused this switch.
The paper has further demonstrated that neither a violation of dynamic consistency,
nor of consequentialism – typical sources for deviations from standard rationality when
extending ambiguity averse preferences to dynamic settings – is the source of this sur-
prising switch. Rather, the paper has uncovered that MLU favours ’extreme’ priors and
hence does not preserve set-inclusion stability of prior and posterior sets. Moreover, it
has demonstrated that adopting a less strict MLU is not able to preclude the switch in
betting preferences, irrespective of how moderate the rejection criterion is.
The choice to base the example on the framework of Epstein and Schneider (2007)
was motivated by convenience and to ensure dynamic consistency right from the start.
But the findings of this paper extend to a broader set of models. It immediately extends
to uncertainty averse capacities, as these can be expressed with multiple priors. But
the problematic switch in betting preferences is not restricted to ambiguity averse pref-
erences and may thus occur both in alternative multiple prior models and for general
capacities. An ambiguity loving max-max decision-maker, for example, can be expected
to be surprisingly reluctant to bet on black upon having observed the draw of one white
ball. The upshot here is that MLU has broad repercussions through its effect on the
belief dynamics.
The findings of this paper are relevant for various reasons. In a normative dimension,
it is hard to argue why a decision-maker that initially was more cautious in her descrip-
tion of the probabilistic environment, and accordingly less willing to expose herself to
ambiguity, should change this and, upon observing information, become more willing to
bet on this ambiguous source of uncertainty, both relative to a risky counterpart and
relative to an seu decision-maker. Accordingly, all economic applications that intend to
model intertemporal ambiguity averse preferences ought to be aware of the unintuitive
implications MLU may have on their results. The obvious alternative is to rely on full
Bayesian updating. To ensure learning with the set of posteriors converging to the true
parameter, it is just needed to avoid that the initial prior set contains ’certainty’ priors
that are immune to re-evaluation. In a positive dimension, the findings of this paper raise
the empirical question whether choices of decision-makers are compatible or in conflict
with the stability of set inclusion of beliefs. In a similar direction, recent experimental
evidence shows that some individuals prefer ambiguous over risky bets, especially for
unlikely events and losses (Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2015). This is interpreted
as ambiguity seeking. The present paper shows that such ambiguity seeking behavior
11
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can be compatible with ambiguity aversion given specific beliefs, hence adding a further
dimension to the recent debate on ambiguity attitudes, in particular in dynamic settings.
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Appendix A The general result
In line with the example in the main text, this appendix focuses on two decision-makers,
the meu decision-maker with the full prior set M0 = ∆(Θ) and an alternative decision-
maker meu′ with a smaller prior set M′0 ⊂ M0. The seu decision-maker following the
principle of insufficient reason is the special case of meu′ with M0 being the singleton
containing just the uniform distribution.
To show that no rejection parameter 0 < α ≤ 1 can prevent a switch in betting
preferences, the strategy in this appendix is to prove that for any α there is a pair of
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urns similar to urn R and urn A and a signal history st for which M′t 6⊂ Mt, hence
violating (6). For this purpose, we start by generalizing the setting from urns with three
balls to arbitrary symmetric settings. Then we construct, for given rejection parameter
α, a suited urn and signal such that M′t 6⊂ Mt.
The generalized urn R and urn A, denoted by UR(n, k) and UA(n, k), respectively,
have exactly 2n+ k balls. It is known that n balls are black, n balls are white and each
of the remaining k balls can either be black or white. As will become clear in what
follows, the urns in the example in the main text correspond to the case n = k = 1.
To generalize the three balls urn example, we assume that the number of black balls
within the k unknown balls in urn UR(n, k) is uniformly distributed.
6 The urn UA(n, k)
is basically the same, but without information about the distribution of the k unknown
balls. In either case, the parameter set is Θ = {n/(2n+ k), . . . , (n+ k)/(2n+ k)} with
θ ∈ Θ being the true fraction of black balls in the urn, unknown to the decision-maker.
The period state space is again S with the full state space S∞. The likelihood functions
are fully specified by l(s = B|θ) = θ.
As mentioned above, let M0 = ∆(Θ) be the full prior set. For M′0, it is convenient
to consider symmetric sets around the uniform distribution,
∆(k) =
{
(ν0, . . . , νk) |
∑
i
νi = 1 , 0 ≤  ≤ νi ≤ 1− k ≤ 1 ∀i ,  < 1k+1
}
. (7)
By construction, all these sets contain the uniform distribution. The full set of priors
∆(Θ) is the special case ∆
(k)
 with  = 0, and for  → 1/(k + 1) the set collapses to
a singleton with the uniform distribution as the only element. Clearly, ∆
(k)
′ ⊂ ∆(k) if
′ > . We now have the toolkit at hand to formulate and prove the main result.
Proposition A.1. Let 0 < α ≤ 1 be a rejection parameter. Let M0 = ∆(Θ) and
M′0 = ∆(k) with 0 <  < α/2. Then there are generalized urns UR(n, k) and UA(n, k)
characterized by (n, k) ∈ N2 and a signal history st such that Mαt ′ 6⊂ Mαt .
Proof. We even construct the stronger Mαt ′ ∩ Mαt = ∅. Without loss of generality,
consider the bet 1B0. Accordingly, the suited signal history will be constructed by
repeated observations of black balls, st = (B, . . . , B). For M0 = ∆(Θ) and M′0 =
∆
(k)
 , the maximal plausible prior after observing only black signals is (0, . . . , 1) and
(, . . . , , 1 − k), respectively. The condition Mαt ′ ∩ Mαt = ∅ is equivalent with meu
rejecting the most plausible prior held by meu′. This condition, after multiplying with
(2n+ k)t, reads

k−1∑
i=0
(n+ i)t + (1− k) (n+ k)t < α(n+ k)t , (8)
6An alternative generalization would be that of k independent coin flips. The uniform choice, however,
is more intuitive and technically simpler.
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which is, by dividing by (n+ k)t, equivalent with

k−1∑
i=0
(
n+ i
n+ k
)t
+ (1− k) < α . (9)
There is a t = t(n, k) such that ((n+ i)/(n+ k))t < 1/k for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k−1. A sufficient
condition for (9) is thus + 1− k < α, equivalent with
k > 1 +
1− α

. (10)
The choice kˆ := b1 + 1−α c+ 1 does the job. The initial restriction  < α/2 makes sure
that  < 1/(kˆ + 1) and is hence feasible, cf. (7).
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